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Inflation indexing is an important and controversial issue in the design of tax
systems and transfer programs. The choice of whether—and how—to adjust 
policy parameters for inflation carries significant political, distributional, and 
macroeconomic implications. In recent years, indexing has gained particular 
attention in three policy contexts: (1) whether to switch from an “unchained” to
“chained” inflation index when calculating Social Security benefits; (2) whether 
to make a similar unchained-to-chained shift when setting federal income tax 
parameters such as bracket thresholds and deduction amounts; and (3) whether 
to index basis for inflation when calculating capital gains. Hundreds of billions of 
dollars ride on the resolution to these three questions. 
Across all of these contexts, the debate over inflation indexing is generally 
framed in terms of “accuracy.” When the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform chaired by Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles 
recommended in 2010 that Social Security cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) 
be calculated using the “chained” Consumer Price Index (CPI), the commission
emphasized that chained CPI is “a more accurate measure of inflation.”1 The 
Center for a Responsible Federal Budget, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank 
that picked up the chained CPI mantle after the Simpson-Bowles commission
dissolved, likewise listed accuracy as its primary justification for chaining: 
“[P]olicymakers should ensure that the most accurate measure of inflation is 
being used,” the group declared in a white paper, and “[a]n overwhelming
majority of economists from both parties agree that the chained CPI is a far more
accurate measure of inflation than the CPI measurements currently in use.”2 
When the Obama administration proposed a switch to chained CPI across federal 
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84 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:83 
tax and transfer programs in 2013, it foregrounded the “accuracy” argument as 
well.3 
The case for capital gains indexing has proceeded on similar premises. For 
example, Reed Shuldiner—in a comprehensive and insight-packed 1993 article 
on indexation—argued that computing capital gains without adjusting for 
inflation produces an “inaccurate” result.4 The congressional Joint Economic 
Committee, in a 1999 report, similarly said that indexing is necessary in order to 
“measure capital gains correctly.”5 Lawyers Charles Cooper and Vincent 
Colatriano—in a 2012 article urging the Treasury Department to index capital 
gains for inflation via executive action—wrote that capital gains indexation would
“more accurately assess[] the actual increase in a person’s wealth or purchasing 
power.”6 Accuracy-based arguments for capital gains indexation sprung to life 
again in 2019 when President Trump asserted that he had the power to index 
capital gains for inflation of his own accord.7 
Critics of chained CPI and capital gains indexation have joined issue on the 
accuracy point. The AARP, which opposes the use of chained CPI for Social 
Security COLAs, has argued that chained CPI is “even less accurate than the 
current formula.”8 Hundreds of economists who signed a letter opposing the use 
of chained CPI for Social Security in 2012 agreed that the annual Social Security
COLA “should be based on the most accurate measure possible of the impact of 
inflation on beneficiaries,” but disputed that chained CPI was the best way to
achieve that goal.9 More recently, in the debate over whether the Trump
administration should index capital gains for inflation via executive action, critics 
of the move have argued that indexing capital gains, but not other elements of 
3. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 
46 (2013) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2014-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2014-BUD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7RU-4VC2] (“Most economists agree that the chained CPI provides a more accurate
measure of the average change in the cost of living than the standard CPI.”). 
4.  Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537, 550 (1993). 
5. JOINT  ECON. COMM. STAFF REPORT, CUTTING  CAPITAL  GAINS  TAX  RATES: THE  RIGHT
POLICY FOR THE 21st CENTURY 9 (1999), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1c3a5162-63fa-
411e-8e4b-f85e910869a0/cutting-capital-gains-tax-rates-whitman-august-1999.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D363-AKUZ]. 
6.  Charles J. Cooper & Vincent Colatriano, The Regulatory Authority of the Treasury Department
to Index Capital Gains for Inflation: A Sequel, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 497 (2012). 
7. See Alan Rappeport, Trump Says He Can Cut Tax on Gains on His Own, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2019, at A21. President Trump later said through a spokesperson that he would not pursue capital gains 
indexation via executive action “at this time.” Andrew Restuccia & Kate Davidson, Trump Rules Out 
Indexing Capital-Gains Taxes to Inflation ‘at This Time,’  WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2019), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/trump-again-mulls-capital-gains-tax-cuts-11568210829 [https://perma.cc/TX88-
QP5L]. On the new push for indexing capital gains via executive action, see generally Daniel Hemel & 
David Kamin, The False Promise of Presidential Indexation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 693 (2019). 
8. David Certner, Chained CPI for Social Security Not More Accurate for Seniors, AARP: WHERE
WE  STAND (Feb. 21, 2013, 1:24 PM), https://blog.aarp.org/where-we-stand/chained-cpi-for-social-
security-not-more-accurate-for-seniors [https://perma.cc/4VTY-RN2Q].
 9. ECON. POLICY INST., ECONOMIST AND SOCIAL INSURANCE EXPERT STATEMENT ON SOCIAL
SECURITY COLA: NO EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR REDUCING THE SOCIAL SECURITY COLA 1 (Nov. 20, 
2012), https://www.epi.org/files/2012/EPI_COLA_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7T8-U9BL]. 
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the tax code, would lead to the “mismeasurement” of income—a direct 
counterpoint to the “accuracy” claim pushed by proponents.10 
This Article argues that—across all three of these indexing debates (and 
several more)—the emphasis on “accuracy” misses the mark in two respects. 
First, inflation is not a quantity that exists in the world apart from how it is 
measured. It is not like the distance from London to New York, which can be
measured accurately or inaccurately. To say that chained CPI is more “accurate”
than unchained CPI is something like saying that a U.S. liquid pint measure is 
more “accurate” than an imperial pint measure. We may have good reasons for 
using a U.S. liquid pint rather than an imperial pint—or vice versa—but 
“accuracy” is not one of them. Likewise, we may have good reasons for caring
more about the month-to-month change in the price of a fixed basket of goods 
and services (standard CPI) or about the month-to-month change in the price of 
a fixed level of consumption utility (chained CPI), but neither is more “accurate” 
than the other. 
Second, and more importantly, the adjustment of policy parameters over time
is not, at its core, a question of technical accuracy. How Social Security benefits 
ought to change year to year, how the schedule of tax rates ought to change over 
time, and whether inflationary gains ought to be included in the tax base are not 
questions of measurement. They are, instead, value judgments. “Accuracy” in 
this context turns out to be both an illusion and a distraction.11 
Seeing through the mirage of “accuracy” is important not only because it 
offers a clearer-eyed view of the values at stake in indexing debates, but also 
because it opens up broader vistas for tax and transfer policymaking. For 
example, rather than focusing on whether “unchained” or “chained” versions of 
the CPI provide more “accurate” measures of inflation, we might ask whether
pensioners and disabled adults ought to share in the gains from economic growth. 
An affirmative answer to the latter question would suggest that Social Security
benefits ought to be tied to an index that tracks overall economic changes (for 
example, nominal gross domestic product) rather than an index that tracks only 
price-level changes (for example, unchained or chained CPI). Likewise, instead 
of a crimped choice between unchained and chained CPI for tax bracket 
thresholds and deduction amounts, we might imagine tying tax system 
parameters to deficit levels or business cycle measures. And instead of an 
argument about capital gains indexation framed in “accuracy” terms, we might 
imagine a more direct discussion about whether—and how much—the income
tax should operate as a tax on wealth. 
10. See Bernie Becker, Avoid Taking Shelter, POLITICO: MORNING TAX (Aug. 7, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-tax/2019/08/07/avoid-taking-shelter-466008 
[https://perma.cc/268F-YWNM] (quoting Kyle Pomerleau of the Tax Foundation). 
11. For a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the limits of accuracy in financial indexation more 
generally, with reference to the CPI as well as the S&P 500 index and the London InterBank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) index, see Gabriel Rautenberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise, 
and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 21–23 (2013). 
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Each of these questions will require more than this short Article to answer.
The modest goal here is to show why indexing decisions ought to be “unchained,” 
so to speak, from a narrow focus on “accurate” measures of inflation. Part II 
introduces the indices according to which tax and transfer parameters are
adjusted and the contexts in which indexation questions arise. Part III—the heart 
of the Article—presents the case against “accuracy” as an objective for 
parameter adjustment. Part IV considers implications of this argument for 




A. The Index Menu
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), an agency within the Department of 
Labor, is the primary producer of inflation statistics in the United States. The 
BLS began to publish the CPI in 1919 after rapid price-level rises during World 
War I intensified interest in inflation measurement.12 For most of its history, the 
CPI tracked price changes affecting urban workers.13 In 1978, the agency
introduced a new measure, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
(CPI-U), and changed the name of the old CPI to the Consumer Price Index for 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).14 CPI-U and CPI-W differ 
in the relative importance of their components: CPI-U, for example, places a 
larger weight on housing, while CPI-W places a larger weight on transportation.
In 1987, Congress directed the BLS to develop an experimental price index
for elderly consumers in addition to CPI-U and CPI-W.15 This measure— 
formerly known as “CPI-E,” and recently retitled “CPI-XE”16—places a larger 
weight than CPI-U and CPI-W on certain index components (most notably, 
medical care) and a smaller weight on others (including food and beverages and 
education). The Bureau of Labor Statistics describes CPI-XE as “experimental”
and emphasizes that “it should be interpreted with caution.”17 Because CPI-XE
12. The First Hundred Years of the Consumer Price Index: A Methodological and Political History,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Apr. 2014), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/
the-first-hundred-years-of-the-consumer-price-index.htm [https://perma.cc/7FTA-977U]. 
13. See generally id.
 14. Id. 
15. Kenneth J. Stewart & Joseph Pavalone, Attachment F: Experimental CPI for Americans 62 Years
of Age and Older,  BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: ECON. NEWS RELEASE (1996), https://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/cpi.br12396.a06.htm [https://perma.cc/MFP3-6AJW]. 
16. Renaming of Select Data Series, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT.: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/notices/2019/renaming-data-series.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZT3-LUXM] 
(announcing renaming). 
17. Consumer Price Index Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT.: CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/questions-and-answers.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5C98-T22B].
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is based on a smaller set of households than CPI-U and CPI-W, it is more
vulnerable to the influence of outliers within its sample. Even so, the differences 
between CPI-U, CPI-W, and CPI-XE are modest.18 Although over time CPI-XE 
has outpaced CPI-U and CPI-W, there are some years in which CPI-U and CPI-
W rise more rapidly than CPI-XE.19 
All three of these measures are Laspeyres price indices.20 The name
“Laspeyres” honors the German economist Étienne Laspeyres, who pioneered
the use of this type of measure in the late nineteenth century. A Laspeyres price
index reflects changes over time in a base-period reference basket of goods and 
services. To understand how a Laspeyres price index is calculated, consider the
following example using the hypothetical numbers in Table 1. 
Table 1. Price and Quantity of Apples and Bananas Purchased by a Single Consumer 
Over Two Periods
Period
Apples Bananas Total 
ExpenditurePrice Quantity Expenditure Price Quantity Expenditure
1 $0.50 12 $6 $1 4 $4 $10
2 $1 5 $5 $0.50 10 $5 $10
The Laspeyres price index identifies the change in the price of the base-period 
(Period 1) basket of twelve apples and four bananas. The Laspeyres price index 
“overlooks” the fact that the consumer chooses to buy a different number of 
apples and bananas in the second period after the prices of those items change. I
place “overlooks” in quotation marks because Laspeyres was not unaware of the 
fact that consumers might change the composition of their consumption baskets 
in response to price fluctuations and other factors.21 The Laspeyres price index, 
though, is not a measure of how consumption baskets change; it is a measure of 
how the price of a particular consumption basket changes over time. 
Here, the cost of the consumer’s basket of twelve apples and four bananas 
has risen from $10 in the first period to $1 x 12 + $0.50 x 4 = $14 in the second 
period. Thus the Laspeyres price index is $14/$10 = 1.4. The inflation rate 
calculated according to the Laspeyres price index is 40%. In other words, it costs 
40% more to buy twelve apples and four bananas in the current period than in
the base period. 
18.  From 1982 through 2011, CPI-U and CPI-W both grew at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent 
while CPI-XE increased at an average annual rate of 3.1 percent. Consumer Price Index for the Elderly, 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: THE ECON. DAILY (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_/ 
20120302.htm [https://perma.cc/6TGF-LDA6]. 
19. Id.
20. Technically, CPI-W, CPI-U, and CPI-XE are “modified Laspeyres price” indices, or “Lowe
price” indices, rather than true Laspeyres price indices. A true Laspeyres price index would update the 
basket every period, while the CPI-U and CPI-W baskets are updated every two years, and the CPI-XE 
basket is updated less consistently than that. CPI-W and CPI-U—and, to a lesser extent, CPI-E—thus do 
reflect changes in consumption patterns, but with a time lag. 
21. See Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Price Indexes and General Exchange Values, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP., no, 1, Winter 1998, at 197, 199–200. 
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An alternative to the Laspeyres price index is the Paasche price index, so 
named for the turn-of-the-twentieth-century German economist-turned-
politician Hermann Paasche. Instead of using the first-period bundle (twelve 
bananas and four apples) as the reference basket, as in the Laspeyres index, the 
Paasche index takes the second-period bundle (five apples and ten bananas) as
the reference basket. Here, the cost of buying five apples and ten bananas has 
fallen from $0.50 x 5 + $1 x 10 = $12.50 in the first period to $10 in the second 
period. Thus the Paasche price index is $10/$12.50 = 0.8, and the inflation rate 
calculated according to the Paasche price index is -20%. In other words, it costs 
20% less to buy five apples and ten bananas in the second period than in the first 
period. 
The Laspeyres and Paasche price indices are both categorized as “fixed 
weight” price indices: they take a fixed basket of goods and measure how the
price of that basket changes over time. The difference is in which basket they 
choose: the Laspeyres price index takes the base period basket as the reference 
basket, while a Paasche price index takes the current period basket as the 
reference basket. In general, the Laspeyres price index will yield a higher 
estimate of inflation than the Paasche price index because consumers substitute
away from goods whose prices have increased more rapidly and toward goods 
whose prices have increased less rapidly or declined.
A “flaw” in any fixed weight price index is that it fails to account for consumer 
substitution in real time. Chained price indices (of which the T örnqvist index is a
particularly prominent example22) seek to correct this “flaw.” I put quotation
marks around “flaw” here because the Laspeyres and Paasche price indices are
perfectly accurate measures of what they purport to measure: the change in the 
price of a basket of goods and services whose component weights remain constant 
over time. Assuming again that the first period is the reference period, the 
Törnqvist index for the basket of apples and bananas in the second period would
be: . . . .$1 $0.50∗ ≈ 1.07$0.50 $1 
This is the product of the ratios of the second-period price to the first-period price 
for each basket component raised to the two-period average of its expenditure 
share. The inflation rate calculated according to this formula would be 7% (that 
is, (1.07 – 1)/1). 
When proponents of the use of chained CPI for policy purposes say that 
chained CPI provides a more “accurate” measure of inflation than fixed-weight 
CPI, what exactly do they mean? Chained CPI reflects an attempt to implement 
the “cost of living” concept. The change in the “cost of living” is the change in 
the minimum expenditure required to attain the same level of consumption utility 
as would be generated by a reference basket of goods and services in the base 
22.  The Törnqvist price index is named for twentieth century Finnish statistician Leo T rnqvist. 
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period. The Törnqvist index provides an approximation of the change in the cost 
of living given certain assumptions about consumers’ utility functions. The 
Laspeyres index, by contrast, provides an upper-bound estimate of the change in
the cost of living. A Paasche index would give a lower bound. None of these 
formulas, however, can give us an exact measure of the change in the cost of living
or its upper or lower bound because we cannot directly observe the consumption
utility that consumers derived from apples and bananas and other goods and
services across periods, which may vary with a whole host of nonprice factors.
For example, apples may taste better when crime is low and the Mets are in first 
place.
The BLS introduced the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (C-CPI-U) in August 2002, with estimates extending back to 
December 1999 (the reference period).23 In most months, the change in the C-
CPI-U is the same as or 0.1 percentage points lower than the change in the CPI-
U.24 Over time, however, small differences compound. Thus, from December 
1999 through December 2016, the C-CPI-U increased by 37.3 percent,25 while the
CPI-U increased by 43.5 percent.26 
The four indices discussed here—CPI-W, CPI-U, CPI-XE, and C-CPI-U— 
come nowhere close to exhausting the full range of inflation measures produced 
by the BLS and other statistical agencies. They are, however, the primary options 
that policymakers consider when designing inflation-indexed taxes and benefits. 
The next subpart considers the particular policy contexts in which inflation
indexing debates have arisen. 
B. Indexing Controversies 
1. Social Security Benefits
Social Security is often described as the “third rail” of American politics.27 It
is also the third rail of inflation indexing—the policy context in which inflation
indexing battles are most heated and the lens through which other inflation 
indexing controversies are often viewed.28 And it is probably the most
23. ROBERT CAGE ET AL., INTRODUCING THE CHAINED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1 (2003),
https://www.bls.gov/additional-resources/chained-cpi-introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/B72K-P3PV]. 
24. Id. at 5. 
25. Table 24C. Historical Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U): U.S. 
City Average, All Items, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Aug. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-
resources/chained-cpi-table24C.pdf [https://perma.cc/U66B-ULS6]. 
26. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl 
[https://perma.cc/XY23-SNQM].
 27. See, e.g., Terry Weiner, Touching the Third Rail: Explaining the Failure of Bush’s Social Security 
Initiative, 35 POL. & POL’Y 872, 872 (2007). 
28. See, e.g., David Dayen, The Biggest Trojan Horse in the Republican Tax Plan, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/145688/biggest-trojan-horse-republican-tax-plan [https:// 
perma.cc/4629-DW6E] (“Even if this specific legislation [adopting chained CPI for income tax
parameters] doesn’t touch Social Security, make no mistake: It puts Social Security under threat.”); Using
the Chained CPI in the Tax Code: Will Social Security Be Next?, NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC.
SECURITY & MEDICARE (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.ncpssm.org/documents/general-archives-
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complicated example of indexing in practice. A brief bit of background, 
therefore, may help to set the stage for the Social Security indexing debate. 
Retired workers receive monthly Social Security benefits based on their 
“primary insurance amount,” which is calculated by multiplying “average 
indexed monthly earnings” by a series of percentage replacement factors. 
Average indexed monthly earnings are based on the worker’s highest thirty-five 
years of earnings in covered employment.29 Once a worker becomes eligible for 
Social Security retirement benefits, her benefit amount grows based on the Social 
Security COLA.30 This scheme raises two indexing-related questions: (1) what 
index should be used to calculate average indexed monthly earnings?; and (2) 
what index should be used to calculate the COLA? 
For example, imagine an individual born in 1960 who begins collecting the
Social Security retired-worker benefit in 2022. Let’s say that she earned $50,000 
in the year 2000 and that the year 2000 will be one of the thirty-five years factored
into her average indexed monthly earnings amount. One question is how much 
her $50,000 in year 2000 dollars should count for when calculating her average 
indexed monthly earnings, and thus her primary insurance amount, in 2022. A 
second question is how much her Social Security benefits should increase each 
year after she begins collecting in 2022.
Congress has answered the first question by choosing the “national average 
wage index,”31 which tracks the nominal change in the mean taxable 
compensation reported by employers year after year.32 The national average
wage index is (by design) not an inflation index; it is a measure of something else 
entirely (wage growth). For the second question (the COLA), Congress has 
chosen CPI-W.33 This latter choice is, on first glance, somewhat surprising: after
all, CPI-W tracks changes in the consumption patterns of urban workers, while 
Social Security beneficiaries are typically out of the workforce. The reliance on 
CPI-W can be explained historically by the fact that Congress adopted the COLA 
provision in 1972,34 which was before the advent of CPI-U or CPI-XE. And the
choice of index has stuck.
2017/using-chained-cpi-tax-code-will-social-security-next [https://perma.cc/9PRF-AMFJ] (“The 
proposal in the House and Senate Republicans’ tax reform plan to move to a ‘chained’ Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to calculate increases in the tax code brackets and the standard deduction can only be seen 
as part of a broader plan to extend the use of this index when adjusting Social Security benefits for 
inflation. It is the elephant’s nose under the tent.”). 
29. Social Security Benefit Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/
Benefits.html [https://perma.cc/R68H-J2SH].
 30. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY PLANNER 8–9 (May 7, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R42035.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FNV-EP7R]. 
31.  42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). 
32. Net Compensation Defined, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/net/comp./ 
html [https://perma.cc/MHP7-KM5K]. 
33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY: COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS 1 (Nov. 19, 
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-803.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L8N-8VBM] (basing COLA on CPI-W). 
34. Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary and Legislative History, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., (Mar. 1973) https://www.ssa.gov/history/1972amend.html [https://perma.cc/4E3E-
R2EA]. 
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Proposals to shift from the national average wage index to an inflation-
focused measure for calculating the primary insurance amount have emerged at
various points.35 The question of wage indexing is interesting and important; it
has not, however, been a primary focus of policymakers’ attention over the past 
decade. More recently, debates about Social Security reform have centered on 
two major proposals to change the COLA formula. The first—which has received 
the most attention—would tie COLAs to the C-CPI-U.36 Because C-CPI-U tends 
to grow at a slightly slower rate than CPI-W, this proposal would have the effect 
of reducing benefits over time. In December 2018, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that tying COLAs to C-CPI-U instead of CPI-W for Social
Security benefits would reduce benefits—and thereby reduce the federal 
deficit—by $134 billion over the next decade.37 Applying a similar change to other 
benefit programs with COLAs—including civil service and veterans’ pensions
and Supplemental Security Income—would reduce benefits (and the deficit) by
an additional $33 billion over a decade.38 Then-President Obama included a 
proposal for chained CPI in his fiscal year 2014 budget, though he omitted the 
proposal from subsequent budgets after strong political backlash.39 
A second proposal—championed by Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont,
among others—would link Social Security COLAs to CPI-XE.40 The effect of this
proposal on benefit levels and deficits would depend on which index increases at 
a faster rate. Due largely to rising health care costs, CPI-XE has generally grown 
more rapidly than CPI-W and CPI-U in recent years, though there is no 
guarantee that the trend will continue.
2. Tax Thresholds 
While the use of chained CPI for Social Security has been debated for several 
years, chained CPI for tax thresholds had garnered less attention until 2017, when 
congressional Republicans included a chained CPI provision in their $1.4 trillion
tax cut bill.41 That law, as passed, provides that inflation-indexed thresholds in
the Internal Revenue Code—including the bracket cutoffs, the maximum earned
income tax credit, the standard deduction amounts, and the caps on contributions 
35. For an overview, see John F. Cogan & Olivia S. Mitchell, Perspectives from the President’s 
Commission on Social Security Reform, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 2, Spring 2003, at 149, 158–59. 
36. See, e.g., Editorial, A Better Stat for Inflation, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-better-stat-for-inflation/2012/11/25/592e4ad4-3405-11e2-
bb9b-288a310849ee_story.html [https://perma.cc/QF5K-VLU6] (endorsing shift to chained CPI for 
Social Security COLAs). 
37. Use an Alternative Measure of Inflation to Index Social Security and Other Mandatory Programs, 
CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54752 [https:// 
perma.cc/N8TJ-5NPP]. 
38. Id.
39. For a catalog of congressional Democrats’ negative responses to President Obama’s chained 
CPI proposal, see Andrew Johnson, Democrats Slam Obama’s Chained CPI Proposal, NAT’L REV. (Apr.
5, 2013), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/democrats-slam-obamas-chained-cpi-proposal-andrew-
johnson [https://perma.cc/GLA5-A5CT]. 
40.  Social Security Expansion Act, S. 478, 116th Cong. §3(b) (2019). 
41.  Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
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to tax-preferred retirement plans—will increase with chained CPI (C-CPI-U) 
rather than CPI-U.42 
The use of C-CPI-U rather than CPI-U for bracket changes and the standard 
deduction will mean that more income is subject to higher tax rates. The use of
C-CPI-U for the earned income tax credit (EITC) will lead to smaller EITC 
payouts. The net effect of these and other changes to tax liability resulting from 
the switch to C-CPI-U will be to raise revenue by $133.5 billion over the 2018– 
2027 period (and more afterwards), partly offsetting the negative revenue effects 
of the tax cuts elsewhere in the same bill.43 Somewhere around half of those costs 
will be borne by the top twenty percent of taxpayers by income.44 
3. Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation 
Proposals to index capital gains—which are currently not indexed at all— 
have percolated for several decades. Without indexing, a taxpayer calculates gain 
and loss on the sale or exchange of an asset by subtracting “basis”—which, in the 
simplest case, is the price in nominal dollars that the taxpayer paid when 
purchasing the asset—from the amount realized. The result is that taxable gains 
accrue purely by virtue of inflation. Proponents of indexing basis for inflation
argue that the non–indexation status quo therefore leads to the inaccurate 
measurement of income.45 
In 1982 and several times thereafter, legislation to index basis for inflation 
passed one house of Congress, but it has never become law.46 On two occasions,
proponents of indexation have pressed the White House to index basis for 
inflation via executive action—specifically, by ordering the Treasury Department 
and the IRS to issue a regulation that construes the term “cost” in the statutory
definition of “basis” to be an asset’s real, rather than nominal, cost. The first such
push came in the early 1990s, when President George H.W. Bush was in office.47 
At the time, the leading presidential indexation advocates were explicitly 
agnostic as to the particular index used.48 More recently, several advisers to 
President Trump as well as allies of the administration outside government have 
42. Id. 
43. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON  TAXATION, 115th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
PUBLIC LAW 115-97 443 (Comm. Print 2017). 
44. See T13-0105 - Tax Parameters Indexed with Chained CPI, Current Law; Distribution of Federal 
Tax Change by Cash Income Percentile, 2020, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Mar. 8, 2013),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/distributional-effects-indexing-tax-parameters-using-
chained-cpi/tax-parameters-0 [https://perma.cc/4R6D-LJS7] (noting that those with a cash income in the 
top quintile will be responsible for 48.6 percent of the share of total federal tax change). 
45. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
46. On the history of proposals to index capital gains for inflation, see generally JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS 7-5700, INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS FOR INFLATION 6–9 
(2018). 
47. Id. at 8. 
48. See Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin, & Vincent J. Colatriano, The Legal Authority of the
Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a Regulation Providing for Indexation of Capital Gains, 12 
VA. TAX REV. 631, 639 n.19 (1993) (noting that “we have not examined the merits of various indexing
schemes”). 
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urged him to do the same.49 President Trump reportedly told advisers in 
September 2019 that he would not move ahead with indexing capital gains for 
inflation, but might reconsider it later.50 Now that chained CPI (and specifically,
C-CPI-U) is the index used for other tax parameters, it seems likely that a future 
capital gains indexation proposal would likewise tie the calculation of basis to C-
CPI-U rather than another index.51 
III
ACCURACY AS A DISGUISE FOR VALUE JUDGMENTS
The central argument of this Article is that there is no one “accurate”
measure for how policy parameters should be adjusted over time to account for 
inflation. The adjustment of tax and transfer parameters is, instead, primarily a
value judgment for which no macroeconomic measure can substitute. Once one 
considers the arguments for adjustment and the features of different price
indices, moreover, the normative case for C-CPI-U turns out to be uneasy at best. 
A. “Accuracy” and Social Security Indexation
Recall that C-CPI-U is an approximation—and only that—of the cost of 
attaining the same level of consumption utility as would be generated by the 
reference basket of goods and services in the base period. For proponents of
using C-CPI-U to calculate Social Security COLAs, the justificatory burden is to
explain why the guidepost for adjustment should be the change in the C-CPI-U.
C-CPI-U is consistent with at least one function of the Social Security system.
Social Security’s Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
program can be understood as a form of forced consumption smoothing. Because
of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, individuals maximizing their 
own expected utility will want to smooth consumption over time and across states 
of the world. With OASDI, we transfer some amount of consumption from our 
working years to years in which we are unable or less able to work due to seniority 
or disability. Accomplishing this through a mandatory program addresses 
adverse selection problems that plague private-sector wage insurance schemes. 
Inflation indexing seeks to ensure that consumption utility remains steady 
throughout our lifetimes. The use of C-CPI-U is broadly consistent with this 
objective: it ensures—or tries to—that retirees, survivors, and disabled workers
49. On the dubious legality of indexing basis for inflation via executive action, see Hemel & Kamin, 
supra note 7. 
50. Andrew Restuccia & Kate Davidson, Trump Rules Out Indexing Capital-Gains Taxes to 
Inflation ‘at This Time,’  WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-again-mulls-
capital-gains-tax-cuts-11568210829 [https://perma.cc/33LP-NH7C]. 
51. See, e.g., John Ricco, Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/23/indexing-capital-gains-to-
inflation [https://perma.cc/8NAF-V4VG] (calculating revenue and distributional consequences of capital 
gains indexation on the assumption that chained CPI would be the index used).
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can derive the same amount of consumption utility from spending their OASDI 
benefits each year.52 
Social Security is not, however, exclusively a mechanism for consumption-
smoothing. The OASDI program is also a mechanism for redistribution, and this
is even more the case for Social Security’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program. How much we ought to redistribute depends on some weighing of 
distributive benefits against efficiency costs. Distributional goals are likely to 
vary across time periods, but not necessarily according to C-CPI-U. Overall
economic growth and changes in income and wealth inequality—as well as
changes in price levels—shape our distributional objectives.53 All this would 
counsel in favor of a formula for COLAs that would incorporate growth
measures (for example, nominal GDP) and inequality measures (for example, 
the Gini coefficient). For instance, if real GDP increased significantly and the
wealth gap widened but price levels remained constant, we presumably would 
want to redistribute more than we already do, regardless of whether C-CPI-U or 
any other inflation index showed an increase. 
Seen in this light, C-CPI-U no longer looks like an especially attractive peg 
for Social Security COLAs. CPI-W—which typically outpaces C-CPI-U—will 
likely come closer than C-CPI-U to capturing the range of considerations that
ought to enter the COLA calculus. But framing the choice as between CPI-W 
and C-CPI-U (or CPI-XE) restricts the menu of options unduly. If inflation is not 
the only reason why Social Security benefits should change over time, then
inflation measures should not be the only inputs to the COLA calculation.54 
Another possibility—quite apart from the proposal for a blended index that 
accounts for inflation, growth, and inequality—is not to adjust benefits and tax 
thresholds automatically but instead to rely on Congress to periodically 
recalibrate those parameters via legislation. That was, again, how Social Security
operated pre-1975.55 Of course, Congress can recalibrate policy parameters via
legislation through whatever formula it adopts for automatic adjustment. The 
decision to index and the choice of index simply establish a default rule that 
applies in the event of congressional inaction. 
52. Wage indexing during a worker’s lifetime is more difficult to explain from a consumption 
smoothing perspective. For a discussion of wage indexing and a proposal for reform, see Cogan &
Mitchell, supra note 35, at 157–59. 
53. There are, concededly, strands of libertarian thought that posit that the government’s obligation
is to provide a subsistence-level existence to all individuals. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel 
Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189 (evaluating 
libertarian arguments for a “sufficientarian” safety net). If we adopt that view, then the change in price 
of the basket of goods and services necessary to achieve a subsistence-level existence is, indeed, an
appropriate basis for Social Security COLAs. Note, though, that C-CPI-U is not such a measure, because
it is based on the consumption pattern of all urban American consumers and not specifically those living
near the subsistence level. 
54. Accord Robert J. Shiller, Want to Fix Social Security? Use the Right Wrench, N.Y. TIMES, June 
9, 2013, at BU4. 
55. Cost-Of-Living Adjustments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cola/ series.html 
[https://perma.cc/JZ3X-PNW9]. 
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Seen in that latter light, it is not obvious that the optimal default rule should
reflect an estimate of the optimal change in redistribution across time. For 
example, Congress—knowing that future legislatures will face pressure from 
voters and interest groups to raise benefit levels—may choose an index that
appreciates at a slower rate in order to counteract expected political forces. A 
switch from CPI-W to C-CPI-U may be justified on these grounds, though if C-
CPI-U is the appropriate measure for that purpose, it is by pure happenstance. 
Conversely, Congress—knowing that future legislatures will face pressure to 
favor the rich—may choose an index that appreciates at a faster rate, such as an 
unchained CPI-W or unchained CPI-U. The key point for our purposes is that 
the optimal default rule does not necessarily reflect a measure of anything other 
than a crude balancing of egalitarian and efficiency-enhancing objectives, 
perhaps with a dose of political economy prognostication as well. 
B. “Accuracy” and the Indexation of Tax Code Parameters 
The argument in favor of C-CPI-U for indexing tax code parameters such as 
the bracket thresholds runs into similar obstacles. Whether to index bracket 
thresholds for inflation and, if so, what index to use, are not questions of accuracy. 
Rather, they are at their core choices about how much revenue we want to raise 
and from whom. There is no obvious reason why, for example, the taxable income
threshold at which the thirty-seven percent marginal rate kicks in should move in
synchrony with the cost of attaining a particular amount of consumption utility. 
An inflation index that increases at a faster pace will raise less revenue from high-
income households; an index that increases at a slower rate will raise more. One 
choice of index might be normatively more attractive than another, but not 
because it better measures anything other than our shared values. 
Many commentators do not see the issue this way. Reed Shuldiner, for 
example, writes that “inflation can distort a tax structure” and that “indexation 
can prevent such distortion.”56 But it is not clear whose behavior is being 
distorted. Inflation without indexation certainly can change the tax structure. To
illustrate with an absurdly long timeframe: If we keep the current rate schedule 
in place for the next 440 years and inflation proceeds at a two percent rate, the 
threshold at which the thirty-seven percent rate kicks in for joint filers—$600,000
in tax year 2018—will be the equivalent of $100. We would, for all practical 
purposes, have a thirty-seven percent flat rate. Everyone—but especially low-
income households—would see their average rates rise. But is this a distortion? 
In one sense, yes. Income taxes distort behavior, and an inflation index that 
increases at a slower rate results in higher income taxes. The “distortion” from 
non-indexation, though, is no different from the distortion from explicit rate 
hikes. Higher income taxes, moreover, also lead to more government revenue,
which could be used to pay down the national debt, produce more public goods,
or distribute larger amounts to low-income households. These may be good or 
56. Shuldiner, supra note 4, at 539. 
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bad results (and readers will likely disagree on whether they are good or bad).
But the goodness or badness of higher taxes, smaller deficits, more public goods,
and more redistribution do not depend on whether CPI-U or C-CPI-U is a more 
“accurate” measure of anything. If one wants the government to raise more
revenue, then one should favor C-CPI-U over CPI-U and no indexation over C-
CPI-U. “Accuracy” is, again, of little relevance.
While the choice of index (or the choice not to index) clearly has 
distributional implications, those implications are themselves nonobvious. An
inflation index that increases at a slower pace makes taxes higher and causes the
rate schedule to reach its peak more quickly in real-dollar terms. It in that sense 
makes the tax schedule less graduated, though that does not necessarily mean
less redistributive.57 Lower- and middle-income households will pay more (in
absolute and percentage-of-income terms), but they may also get more back in 
public goods and cash grants. Put somewhat differently, inflation without 
indexing (or, less dramatically, using C-CPI-U instead of CPI-U for inflation 
indexing) makes our tax system look more Nordic: higher average tax rates across 
the income distribution, but more government revenue-raising and more room 
for government spending as a result.58 
Finally, as with Social Security benefits, we might think of indexing tax 
parameters as an exercise in legislative default rule-setting. If we did not index 
bracket thresholds for inflation, Congress presumably would intervene at some
point in the next 440 years and adjust those parameters itself. The question that 
indexing addresses is what default rule should prevail absent legislative action. If 
we are worried about undertaxation by future Congresses, then we might favor 
no indexation or (a distant next-best) C-CPI-U. If we are worried about the
growth of the federal government and adopt a “starve-the-beast” mindset, we 
might opt for CPI-U or any of a number of other measures, for example, bracket
thresholds that rise with nominal GDP, bracket thresholds that rise five percent 
each year regardless of inflation, and so on. Again, since there is no apparent 
reason why tax parameters ought to rise with the particular definition of the cost-
of-living that the Törnqvist index seeks to implement, there is no obvious reason 
why chained CPI ought to take priority over any other index or no index at all. 
Any such argument will have to be made on terrain other than technical accuracy.
C. “Accuracy” and Indexing Capital Gains 
The debate over indexing capital gains is the last refuge of “accuracy”
arguments. Supporters say that indexing would “more accurately assess[] the 
57. See Jason S. Oh, Are Progressive Tax Rates Progressive Policy?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1909, 1215 
(2017) (explaining how “marginal rate cuts at low levels of income often make fiscal policy more 
regressive”). 
58. See Kyle Pomerleau, How Scandinavian Countries Pay for Their Government Spending, TAX 
FOUND. (June 10, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/how-scandinavian-countries-pay-their-government-
spending [https://perma.cc/7DTN-7YXD].
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actual increase in a person’s wealth or purchasing power.”59 And if the goal is to 
tax only real—rather than nominal—changes in wealth, then indexing serves a
purpose. But it is not at all obvious that our goal should be to tax only real 
changes in wealth. Here again, the appeal to “accuracy” substitutes a technical 
argument for a normative one.
To better understand this point, consider the well-known result in public 
finance that a mark-to-market income tax approximates a tax on the nominal 
risk-free return or—alternatively—an annual wealth tax.60 That is, a 
proportionate mark-to-market income tax theoretically exempts risky returns, 
and so we are left with a tax on the risk-free component (this is a version of the 
classic Domar-Musgrave result).61 A forty percent mark-to-market income tax
when the nominal risk-free return is five percent approximates a two percent 
wealth tax.62 When the nominal risk-free return rises or falls, the effective annual 
wealth tax rate rises or falls too.
Seen in this light, indexation simply reduces the effective annual wealth tax. 
If the rate of inflation is three percent, then indexing transforms what was an 
annual wealth tax of two percent (that is, 0.4 x 0.05) into an annual wealth tax of 
0.8 percent (that is, 0.4 x 0.02).63 That, again, may be a good thing if we want a 
lower wealth tax and a bad thing if we want a higher wealth tax. It is not, however, 
a question about “accuracy.” 
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs elides important qualifications
that complicate the capital gains indexing decision. One is that our actual capital 
income tax is not mark-to-market. Indexing decisions therefore potentially affect 
“lock-in”64 whereas a mark-to-market income tax or annual wealth tax would not.
A second is that rates are not flat and losses are not fully deductible, so the classic 
Domar-Musgrave result does not apply perfectly to the world. The joint
determination of the capital income tax rate and the inflation index therefore
affects the tax burden on risk—a higher tax rate with indexing burdens risk more
59. PETER J. FERRARA, AM. FOR TAX REFORM, THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE TREASURY




60. For an exposition, see generally David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L.
REV. 1 (2004). A mark-to-market income tax treats all assets as if they were sold at the end of one tax 
year and repurchased at the beginning of the next. 
61. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 
58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944). 
62. To be more precise, a forty percent mark-to-market income tax when the risk-free return is five 
percent approximates a 1.9 percent wealth tax. (1 – 0.019) x (1.05) ≈ 1.03; 1.05 – 0.4 x 0.05 = 1.03. 
63. Again, we can be slightly more precise. With a forty percent mark-to-market income tax and a
two percent real risk-free rate of return, the mark-to-market income tax (40% x 2% = 0.8%) is equivalent
to a wealth tax of 0.08/1.05 ≈ 7.6%. 
64. “Lock-in” refers to circumstances in which an individual holds onto an appreciated asset, even
though an alternative investment would be optimal from a non-tax perspective, because she seeks to
avoid paying capital gains tax upon sale. See, e.g., Charles C. Holt & John P. Shelton, The Lock-In Effect 
of the Capital Gains Tax, 15 NAT’L TAX J. 337 (1962). 
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than a lower tax rate without indexing. A third qualification concerns the
treatment of supernormal returns. If we want to raise the tax burden on
supernormal returns relative to the risk-free return—for example, because we 
think that supernormal returns represent rents—then that would be a reason to
raise the capital income tax rate and to index. If we want to reduce the tax burden 
on supernormal returns relative to the risk-free return—for example, because we
think that supernormal returns reflect rewards for innovation that the 
government ought to amplify—then that would be a reason to reduce the capital 
income tax rate and not index.65 Finally, indexing capital gains but not other 
elements of the tax code would open the door to arbitrage opportunities, which 
is one reason why proponents of capital gains indexing generally agree that 
indexing ought to apply to interest and related elements of the tax code as well.66 
The administrative and compliance costs of complete indexing, though, may be 
substantial—and sufficient to cause us to call off the whole endeavor. In sum, the 
choice of whether to index capital gains for inflation is difficult. But it is 
ultimately a question of policy rather than a matter of measurement. 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS
This Article has focused on the relatively narrow issue of whether and how to 
index policy parameters for inflation. The central argument is a negative claim:
Indexation is not—or ought not to be—primarily a question of “accuracy.” A
fixed weight (Laspeyres or Paasche) price index can be an accurate measure of 
the change in the price of a fixed basket of goods and services, while a chained 
(Törnqvist) index can be a best-guess estimate of the change in the price of a
given level of consumption utility, though we can never know for sure because 
we cannot directly observe utilities. These observations don’t help us much, 
though, in deciding how to adjust policy parameters over time. Those decisions 
depend on changes in nominal wages, nominal GDP, income inequality, political 
economy, and redistributive preferences, in addition to inflation. 
This discussion (hopefully) helps us better understand the role of 
macroeconomic measures in the law. By basing year-to-year changes in policy 
parameters on measures of inflation, lawmakers outsource difficult distributional 
decisions to the realm of macroeconomics. This is not, though, a situation in
which outsourcing leads to satisfactory results. In deciding how much to tax and 
transfer, we consider—and ought to consider—a range of factors in addition to
price levels. Why, then, should price-level changes alone determine changes in
how much we tax and transfer? 
65. See Charles I. Jones, Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas (Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper, 2019), https://web.stanford.edu/~chadj/toptax.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG99-KXE7] 
(arguing that “top income taxation reduces everyone’s income, not just the income at the top”). 
66. See Hemel & Kamin, supra note 7, at 704–05. 
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The decision to outsource distributional decisions is not necessarily borne out 
of ignorance. The appeal to macroeconomic measures may instead be 
instrumentally rational for a number of reasons. In some cases, choosing one
index over another—or indexation over non–indexation, or vice versa—allows 
lawmakers to better achieve their distributional goals without necessarily stating 
their motivations. Relatedly, indexation may serve to reduce lawmakers’ 
decisional costs or may structure future decisional environments in politically
useful ways. Indexation, in other words, may be a strategically valuable tool even
if it is a dubious normative basis for policy parameter adjustment. 
The analysis here also might suggest that decoupling year-to-year policy
parameter changes from inflation can—perhaps surprisingly—create new space
for law and macroeconomics to operate. One reason why we might want to adjust 
policy parameters year to year is macroeconomic stabilization. We might, for 
example, want tax rates and transfers to move countercyclically—responding to 
real growth (or lack thereof) rather than or in addition to price-level changes.
Loosening the link between policy-parameter changes and inflation may open a 
discussion about how we think taxes and transfers ought to adjust to new 
macroeconomic conditions, with price levels being one of many conditions that 
we could consider. 
Finally, a focus on inflation indexing serves as a reminder of the law and
macroeconomics movement’s distributive stakes. Indexing policy parameters for 
inflation—which might at first glance appear to be a technical question of 
macroeconomic measurement—turns out to be very much a question of who 
owes what to whom. The law and (micro)economics movement has faced 
criticism—some of it warranted—for overlooking or sidelining distributional
impacts in its analysis.67 Law and macroeconomics can learn a lesson from that 
experience and chart a different course.
67. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and 
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
1649 (2018). 
